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 This thesis is a research and analysis project that sought to understand the energy policies 
in North and South Carolina that have led to different growths of solar energy generation in the 
two states. When considering the states’ proximity to each other and similar solar resources, they 
should have similar numbers of installations and capacity. In national rankings of cumulative 
installed solar electric capacity, however, North Carolina ranks second while South Carolina 
ranks sixteenth. This suggests policy differences between the two states that have helped North 
Carolina and hindered South Carolina. This project was examined from the lenses of legislation, 
utility regulation, and external factors and events. Research was completed through a number of 
sources including legislative and regulatory policy analysis, literature research, in-person 
interviews, and archived news articles. These sources suggest that North Carolina’s solar success 
over the past two decades is due to a few key, favorable policies that have spurred development: 
historically generous interpretations of the federal Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act, a 
now-expired renewable energy tax credit of 35%, and a renewable portfolio standard. South 
Carolina, on the other hand, has only begun to substantially grow its solar industry in the past six 
or seven years. This has happened through the easing of restrictions that hindered development 
as well as massive public backlash against utilities and conventional sources of electricity 
generation due to a failed nuclear power plant. In the future, new policies in both states will 
likely seek to ensure continued industry growth in the face of concerns about anthropogenic 






 Over the past two decades, the United States has begun a transition from centralized, 
fossil fuel-based power plants to more distributed, renewable energy generation. This transition 
has been driven by steadily falling costs in technologies like solar photovoltaics and batteries, 
concerns about climate change and fossil fuel pollution, and government policies designed to 
guide this transition. The solar industry, in particular, has grown rapidly, spurred by falling 
technology costs, flexibility for use at both residential and utility scales, and the development of 
favorable policies. As Figures 1 and 2 show, the falling costs of solar photovoltaics across 
industries have made solar energy cost-competitive with conventional forms of energy 
production. 
On a state level, much of the development of solar photovoltaics has come in states with 
the most solar resources, such as California, Arizona, and Texas (Figure 3). However, not all 
leaders in solar energy are large in size and located in the American Southwest. North Carolina, 
New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts have all claimed positions in the “Top Ten Solar 
States”, according to the Solar Energy Industries Association (Figure 4). Although those states 
 
Figure 1: Decreases in Costs of Solar Photovoltaics (Fu, Feldman, and Margolis 2018). 
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Figure 2: Levelized Costs of Electricity for Energy Technologies (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2020).
 
Figure 3: Solar Radiation Resources of the United States (Sengupta, Xie, Lopez, Habte, Maclaurin, and Shelby 2018). 
may be lacking in constant solar radiation or size, they have still managed to create successful 
solar energy industries within their respective states. North Carolina, for instance, is ranked 
second in the country in installed solar capacity. While North Carolina is far behind California in 
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Figure 4: State Rankings of Installed Solar Capacity (“Top 10 Solar States” n.d.). 
installed solar capacity, the state has more solar capacity than: Arizona, the state with perhaps 
the highest average photovoltaic potential per square mile; Texas, a state with roughly five times 
more land area; and Florida, also known as “The Sunshine State”. 
While Georgia and Florida, two other southeastern states, also have installed solar 
capacities that rank in the top 10 nationally, the American Southeast has generally not lived up to 
its solar energy potential. Consider, for example, the comparison between North Carolina and its 
smaller neighbor, South Carolina. The states have similar geographic profiles as they slope down 
from the Blue Ridge Mountains in the west to the Atlantic Ocean in the east. The states’ 
proximity suggests that they share many of the same energy issues and political questions; 
indeed, the major utilities present in each state are identical. 
 Despite their similarities, North and South Carolina vary greatly in their implementation 
of solar energy and renewable energy sources in general. This can be seen clearly in Figure 5. 
Although South Carolina actually has a greater solar per-unit area potential, as indicated by the 
lighter yellow shading in the southern half of the state, it is at a clear disadvantage to its neighbor  
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Figure 5: Solar Power Facilities in North and South Carolina (“U.S. Energy Mapping System” n.d.).  
in overall numbers of solar energy facilities (marked by suns on Figure 5).  
In this thesis, I examine why North Carolina, a state with less solar energy resources, has 
dramatically more solar energy facilities than South Carolina. Simply taking size and population  
into account does not answer that question. Rather, when considering energy industries and 
production within a state, it is crucial to look at the specific policies and incentives that a state 
has in place. Historically, emerging technologies like solar photovoltaics have needed incentives 
from government to make them cost-competitive. As such, in order to compare the solar energy 
landscapes of the two states, it is necessary to examine the policy differences that have led to 
different patterns of growth in the solar energy industries of North and South Carolina. These 
differences can be separated into three different categories. First is the question of how the two 
legislative bodies have approached renewable energy. This can be affected by voting, special 
interests and lobbying, state demographics, and a host of other factors. The second factor to 
consider is the role of utility commissions in promulgating standards as well as implementing 
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and regulating legislation from both the state and federal governments. Finally, it is important to 
look at past events or trends that have led leaders in one state or another to favor renewable 
energy over conventional forms. 
 In this Honors Senior Thesis, I will compare these factors in North and South Carolina 
and evaluate how different policies and events have led to different solar energy progress and 
industries in the two states. I first review academic literature on solar energy, energy transitions, 
policy actors in energy production and regulation, and policy tools that are used to support an 
energy transition. I will then evaluate the relevant federal law, such the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act and the federal investment tax credit, that have spurred solar energy investment 
nationwide. Next, I will evaluate the different policies and events that have shaped North and 
South Carolina’s solar industries. Finally, I will briefly discuss key differences and directly 














 To compare solar policy in North and South Carolina, I first needed to know about the 
solar industry in each state. While I had some background knowledge on some of the key issues 
and political landscapes as a native North Carolinian and as a University of South Carolina 
student, I needed to first build a foundation of knowledge for myself to build upon. Over the 
summer of 2019, I served as an intern in the South Carolina Energy Office, which is an agency 
housed under the state Office of Regulatory Staff (ORS). While ORS has the mission of 
protecting the public interest in the regulation of utilities, the Energy Office stands as an 
unbiased source of education and outreach without favoring one side over another (“Mission and 
Values” n.d., “S.C. Energy Office” n.d.). As an intern in the Energy Office, I learned as much as 
I could regarding the current energy landscape of South Carolina while collecting data and 
information that I could use later on. I also discussed the project with a number of experts within 
ORS and the Energy Office, which helped tremendously in learning about both old and new 
policies. 
Once back at school, one of the first research tasks I completed was a database search of 
newspaper archives relating to solar in both states, using the Access World News database and 
searching for articles relating to energy and solar energy in particular. For South Carolina, I 
searched through archives of The State, a Columbia-based newspaper that regularly covers 
energy and environmental issues. In North Carolina, I used archives of The News and Observer, 
a Raleigh-based newspaper that does the same. Both newspapers are owned by The McClatchey 
Co. and are located in each state’s capital city, which theoretically helped to provide equally 
consistent and reliable reporting from both newspapers. By conducting this preliminary research, 
I gained insight into which policies were relevant to my research as well as some of the major 
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issues around those policies at the time. By reading through the archives, I was better able to 
paint a mental picture of what was happening during the passage of decade-old energy laws. 
Once I knew the specific pieces of legislation that I needed to do the majority of my 
research on, it was time to read the laws themselves to evaluate their contents and voting records. 
While I read the laws themselves thoroughly, I also read summaries and analyses of the laws 
conducted by interest groups, the Energy Office, and independent third parties. By gathering 
information from a variety of sources without relying solely on my own evaluations, I was able 
to sort past the legal language of the laws and zero in on the key portions of each law.  
Following this background research, I contacted and interviewed Sammy Fretwell, a 
journalist covering the environment at The State newspaper who has covered much of the 
discourse in South Carolina around climate change, renewable energy, nuclear power, and state 
policy. Through interviewing him, I was better able to gain greater context around the relevant 
policies, including major players and factors, contents of certain policies, and the effects of those 
policies. In addition, I was able to learn some of the major areas of contention for South Carolina 
laws and how interest groups sought to influence decision-making. 
I also knew that many of the relevant laws left some decision-making up to the utility 
commission of each state. I read through utility dockets to see what those decisions were and 
what the arguments were on either side. To support this research, I watched archived footage of 
legislative committee meetings and utility commission hearings; I also read transcripts and 
minutes from many of those same meetings. 
Because not all state government records are posted online, I also visited various libraries 
to conduct additional research. To begin, I met semiregularly in the fall with Bill Sudduth, the 
Head of Government Information and Maps at the University of South Carolina’s Thomas 
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Cooper Library. While Thomas Cooper Library did not have the resources I needed, Mr. Sudduth 
was able to point me in a number of directions and provide introductions to librarians at other 
institutions. I contacted and visited the University of South Carolina School of Law’s library as 
well as Davis Library at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. At both schools, I met 
with a librarian who was willing to share with me the resources available to them. In addition, I 
visited the North Carolina Legislative Library to access records from some of the state’s older 
energy laws. 
Once I had all of the information I needed from a variety of sources, I compiled it and 
started to create a narrative outline on the energy laws, regulations, and overall landscapes for 
each state. Soon after that, I began to write. The figures and data I have compiled and displayed 
come from a variety of sources, including utility dockets, legislative records, the South Carolina 













A Background on Solar Energy 
During the past two decades, the world has begun a slow transition to safer and cleaner 
energy sources. In the face of anthropogenic climate change, renewable energy sources have 
become increasingly popular as low carbon modes of electricity generation. While there are 
many different renewable energy technologies on the market that are more or less suitable for 
different climates and locations, one of the most popular technologies is solar energy. While the 
term “solar energy” encompasses all power and heat produced by solar radiation, solar electricity 
production is generally divided into two different technologies: photovoltaics – also known as 
solar panels – and concentrated solar power. In this literature review, I will focus on 
photovoltaics because of their greater usage and implementation in North and South Carolina; 
concentrated solar power is currently undeveloped in both states. In the following sections, I 
begin with a brief history of photovoltaics in the energy industry, both globally and in the United 
States. I then turn to evaluate the energy transition currently going on within the United States 
before examining the different policy tools used to achieve a clean energy transition. 
Historical Context 
 The first photovoltaic solar module was made commercially available in the mid-1950s 
and was characterized by very low efficiency and low durability (Green 2005). Over the next two 
decades, solar panels improved incrementally, though they were used primarily for space 
missions and satellites. However, in the early 1970s, a jump in efficiency immediately preceded 
an increased interest in terrestrial applications (Green 2005). This interest was largely rooted in 
the quest for alternative sources of energy during the oil crises of the 1970s. In 1979, Democratic 
President Jimmy Carter erected solar panels on the White House as a symbol of increasing 
energy independence from foreign sources. While these panels functioned only as water heaters, 
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they served as a reminder of American energy independence until President Ronald Reagan, a 
Republican, removed them in 1981. After the optimism around energy efficiency and greater 
energy independence under Carter, Reagan’s two terms in office marked an era of policy 
retrenchment – especially in the environmental and renewable energy sector (Karapin 2020). 
Under Reagan, federal funding for R&D of renewable energy fell quickly, and more emphasis 
was placed on cheaper fossil fuels. 
 In the years following Reagan’s presidency, climate change began to emerge on the 
national radar. At the same time, increased polarization over environmental issues quickly 
engulfed climate policy. While President George H.W. Bush initially supported a federal climate 
policy in the early 1990s, resistance from business and party leadership caused his administration 
to retreat (Karapin 2020). Despite this backtrack, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 did include 
some federal government support for renewable energy development and integrated resource 
planning – planning out future capacity acquisitions – within the states (H.R. 776). After a period 
of little progress during the Clinton Administration, the two terms of President George W. Bush 
continued to see little federal action on renewable energy policy. Bush – a Texas native – was 
especially responsive to fossil fuel interests. While his administration was notable for its inaction 
on climate issues, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 did include some concessions to renewable 
energy policy, such as the increase in the investment tax credit for solar energy – a policy that 
will be discussed in subsequent sections (H.R. 6). 
 During President Barack Obama’s administration, attempts to support the expansion of 
renewable energy or to address climate change at the federal level were repeatedly stymied by 
increasingly polarized parties and the effects of the Great Recession. In an effort to address this 
economic crash, the Obama administration did pass the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
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Act in 2009 – a comprehensive law and stimulus package that included massive funds allocated 
for investment in grid modernization, solar energy research, and energy efficiency (H.R. 1, 
United States Environmental Protection Agency 2009).  
In general, however, the Clinton, second Bush, and Obama administrations were marked 
by relative inaction on climate change or renewable energy. Because of this, many states began 
to take matters into their own hands by implementing renewable portfolio standards – laws 
requiring that a certain percentage of electricity generation come from renewable sources – and 
other policies ensuring and incentivizing renewable energy development. While federal tax 
credits were extended multiple times and coincided with drops in the cost of photovoltaics, 
Congress also began the process of phasing out the investment tax credits near the end of the 
Obama administration (Karapin 2020). The credits are currently being phased out with the 
expiration of the residential credit occurring in 2022. 
 While President Obama – a Democrat – entered the Paris Climate Agreement and 
introduced the Clean Power Plan via executive order, his renewable energy policies were largely 
rolled back by President Donald Trump – a Republican – upon his election in 2016. With a pro-
fossil fuel industry and anti-environmental regulation stance, President Trump has undermined 
much of the renewable energy progress made at the federal level. As part of a trade war with 
China, the Trump administration announced a 30% tariff on imported solar panels, which could 
lead to an increase in future installation costs of photovoltaics (Karapin 2020). 
Because of the dual-party system currently in place in the United States, one party can 
take control of all federal branches of government and pass their own energy laws (or roll back 
previous policies). This has been seen in many presidential administrations in the past few 
decades – most notably in the transitions from Carter to Reagan and from Obama to Trump. 
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Because of this system, increasing party polarization, geographic variability, and general 
disagreement over environmental and climate issues, it has been difficult for the federal 
government to put together any comprehensive renewable energy policy (Karapin 2020). 
  At the federal level, the primary driver of solar energy growth has been federal tax 
policy in addition to the aforementioned R&D support for solar developers. However, due to a 
lack of other federal actions on renewable energy and climate change, much of the progress in 
renewable energy industries has been at the state levels. With the historical context of solar 
energy technologies and renewable energy in general in mind, it is easy to see how the United 
States’ energy transition has been slower than transitions in other countries. 
 Worldwide, the transition to renewable energy has been driven by various climate treaties 
and unilateral national action, especially in the European Union. In countries such as Germany, a 
leader in solar energy, national policies and climate change mitigation plans have been used to 
make renewable energy more economically viable (Karapin 2020). In the United States, 
however, there is no national target or climate plan designed to bring renewable energy to greater 
prominence. Other than various federal tax credits and funding for renewable energy 
technologies, the majority of renewable energy policy has been enacted by states (Karapin 2020). 
This has happened largely because of the country’s federalist system and large, variable 
geographic area compared to European countries. Each state has its own priorities as well as its 
own resources, so much of the renewable energy development in the country has occurred in 
states that are particularly rich in a certain resource, such as solar radiation (see Figure 3). Much 
of the pushback against federal climate policy has emerged from this geographic variability – 
while one state may easily transition from conventional fuels to renewable energy in an effort to 
reduce emissions, another state may lack the same resources. 
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As a result of federal inaction, many states have stepped up to fill the void and implement 
their own renewable energy policies, some of which are discussed in subsequent sections. In 
many states, major oil crises helped to drive omnibus energy legislation like renewable portfolio 
standards. While some bills may have been intended for specific energy sources at the time, they 
have opened the door for renewable energy, and especially solar, as costs have decreased 
(Barbose et al. 2019). 
 Despite relatively little federal action on renewable energy, public support for solar 
energy is high. A 2015 study found that the American public generally supports the development 
of utility-scale solar installations (Carlisle et al. 2015), a finding that is supported by recent 
polling data that finds an estimated 80% of Americans favor greater emphasis on solar energy 
(McCarthy 2019). This apparent disconnect between public opinion and federal action is perhaps 
the best illustration of the influence large utilities and the fossil fuel industry have on legislation 
(Karapin 2020).  
Policy Actors 
 To begin to understand the legislative and regulatory landscape for energy policy in the 
U.S., it is important to first understand the actors at play. Different scales of policy all come into 
play, since global events, agreements, and markets can impact energy policy within a single state 
or industry. 
 One important distinction to make is between the external (international) and internal 
(intranational) sides of energy policy (Prontera 2009). Major political actors of the external 
energy economy act at the international level. National governments, as well as international 
corporations, play a major role in international energy politics due to the production and trade of 
energy sources - especially fossil fuels (Prontera 2009). Because larger issues of energy are ones 
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of supply and demand as well as general foreign policy, national governments play a crucial role 
in ensuring that each country’s energy needs are met. This can be seen most prominently in the 
Arab oil embargoes that occurred in the 1970s. While the motivating factors were not related to 
energy, the resulting oil scares changed American views on oil availability and dependence on 
foreign sources (Camp 2019). International treaties, such as the Paris Climate Accords, also are a 
form of external energy policy. 
 Internal energy policy differs in several ways. First, internal energy policy involves a 
different set of actors, including federal and state governments, utilities and energy producers, 
engineers and experts, industry associations, and environmentalists (Prontera 2009). Each of 
these categories can be further divided. For example, utilities and energy producers include fossil 
fuel industries, investor-owned utilities, electric cooperatives, and renewable energy industries 
(Downie 2017). Each of those actors have different priorities, and those divisions come into play 
within the legislative and regulatory spheres of energy policy. In this era of anthropogenic 
climate change, environmentalists are an important category of actors. Environmental groups are 
among the most vocal advocates of clean electricity generation, and they often hold utilities and 
other energy producers accountable for environmental damages or protection (Doblinger and 
Soppe 2013). Environmental accidents caused by energy production – such as the Chernobyl or 
Fukushima nuclear accidents – and concerns about climate change have resulted in greater 
advocacy against conventional energy technologies (Doblinger and Soppe 2013). In addition, 
environmental groups strategize to convince lawmakers of the benefits of new, cleaner 
technologies. Although environmental groups, utilities, and legislatures are often portrayed as 
adversaries, they often work in collaboration with utilities and other special interest groups to 
help adopt different technologies with lower risk (Doblinger and Soppe 2013). For example, a 
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utility in Colorado suffered from a poor environmental reputation due to its reliance on coal; 
however, an alliance with environmentalists helped to provide the credibility needed to 
commercialize wind technologies (Doblinger and Soppe 2013). While previous research and the 
media have highlighted an adversarial relationship between environmental groups and utilities, 
governments, and other groups, the reality is that they often work in harmony to compromise on 
key issues and policies. In this thesis, I primarily focus on the policy tools used by internal policy 
actors. 
Policy Tools 
 There are several different policy tools that have been used in efforts to promote methods 
of renewable energy production such as solar photovoltaics. All of these tools have been used to 
some degree and in combination by the federal government, state governments, or both. 
Tax Credits 
The federal investment tax credit (ITC) seeks to address a problem that any technology 
has in its beginning stages: cost. The ITC serves as a tax credit for investors in solar property. 
Generally, a tax credit is a “dollar-for-dollar reduction in the income taxes that a person or 
company would otherwise pay the federal government” (“Solar Investment Tax Credit [ITC]” 
n.d.). In the case of the ITC, the tax credit can be claimed if the investor purchases an eligible 
solar energy system and installs it. These investors can be residential customers, businesses, or 
utilities. In the United States, the ITC for solar was created along with an ITC for wind in 1978 
(Karapin 2020). While the solar ITC equaled a credit of only 10%, it survived the Reagan era of 
policy retrenchment – unlike the credit for wind energy. The solar ITC was solidified and made 
permanent by the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (H.R. 776). Despite the progress made, the federal 
government went over a decade before establishing further domestic energy legislation with the 
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Energy Policy Act of 2005. While President Bush received criticism for favoring the fossil fuel 
and nuclear industries, the 2005 Act did expand the federal ITC to a credit of 30% (H.R. 6, 
Stokes and Breetz 2018). The credit was only meant to last for another two years with a sunset 
provision, but it has subsequently been extended multiple times.  The expiration of the credit is 
currently set for the end of 2021 as the federal government begins to phase it out. 
In addition to the federal ITC, many states also have supplemental tax credits of varying 
sizes. By 2009, according to a 2012 study, 46 states had implemented tax credits for solar 
technology of some type (Sarzynski, Larrieu, and Shrimali 2012). While some states have made 
the decision to phase out those tax credits, many states still offer one for renewable energy. With 
combined federal and state tax credits, the up-front cost of solar photovoltaics for a homeowner 
or business can be greatly reduced. 
Renewable Portfolio Standards 
 Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) are among the most prevalent renewable energy 
policies at the state level in the United States. An RPS is a policy instrument that generally 
mandates “that a certain percentage or amount of electricity within a state must be generated 
from renewable sources such as wind, solar, geothermal or biomass” (Carley, Nicholson-Crotty, 
and Miller 2017). For the majority of states, this mandate is graduated over time so that certain 
portions of the standard are met in the years before a final deadline. For some states, however, 
this policy may serve only as a goal rather than a mandate. According to the US Energy 
Information Administration, 37 states have adopted some form of an RPS policy (either 
voluntary or mandated), and 29 of those policies are mandated (Figure 6). While different states  
have adopted different standards, RPS policies in general have become more popular as more 
states adopt climate action plans and renewable energy. 
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Figure 6: Map of State Renewable Energy Standards and Goals (“Detailed Summary Maps” 2019). 
Interestingly, the spread of RPS policies has been fairly widespread; the contents of the  
policies, however, have been inconsistent. A study in 2017 found that the mere adoption of an 
RPS by one state is influenced by its neighbors (Carley, Nicholson-Crotty, and Miller 2017). For 
example, a state considering an RPS policy might look to its geographic neighbors and see if 
they have adopted one. If so, the state might examine the effectiveness of the standard as a 
whole; if the policy works, the first state might adopt one as well. However, the contents of the 
RPS policy may vary. The same study found that the actual contents of an RPS policy in one 
state (i.e., its target percentages and dates) are actually more similar to the contents of RPS 
policies found in ideologically similar states – even if they are across the country from one 
another (Carley, Nicholson-Crotty, and Miller 2017). Given that conservatives are historically 
more likely to favor the fossil fuel industry, this makes sense: conservative states generally have 
RPS policies that are less ambitious or even voluntary, while left-leaning states generally have 
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more ambitious mandates. 
 A major part of many states’ RPS policies is the renewable energy certificate, or REC, 
system in which utilities are required or given the option to purchase RECs. RECs are “tradable 
credit[s] for each megawatt-hour (MWh) of generation that is sold separately from the electricity 
a system generates” (Gaul and Carley 2012). In essence, the REC shows a state that a utility has 
purchased renewable energy over a fixed term. Since many states’ RPS policies include a so-
called ‘solar set-aside’ – a policy that mandates a certain percentage of the standard be met by 
solar power – utilities must also purchase solar renewable energy credits (SRECs). In many 
states along the eastern seaboard, SREC transactions have served as a primary mechanism for 
growth; however, some states place limits on what kinds of transactions occur. For example, 
North Carolina’s RPS policy, passed in 2007, states that utilities can satisfy their requirements by 
purchasing RECs (N.C. S. 3). While it is possible to purchase RECs from out-of-state in case of 
lower costs, North Carolina requires that only 25% of utility RECs can be met in this way. The 
line of thinking behind this is that by limiting how many RECs can come from out-of-state, the 
state of North Carolina could begin to build its own solar market rather than depending on that of 
other states. 
Net Metering 
 A major way for states to make solar power more cost-effective for homeowners is 
through net metering, a mechanism that “forces utility companies to pay customers that create 
their own electricity the same amount of money as they charge customers per megawatt” 
(Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008). Net metering was legal in a number of states prior to 2005, 
but the Energy Policy Act of 2005 required that each state utility commission would at least 
consider the implementation of net metering (H.R. 6). A common example of net metering in 
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practice is residential solar energy. If a homeowner puts solar panels on their roof and enters an 
interconnection agreement with their utility, then the utility must pay them – now referred to as a 
customer-generator – for any excess power that the panels push back onto the grid. States make 
net metering legal for a number of reasons. The first is that it can help diversify the state’s 
energy supply through distributed generation (Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008). Additionally, 
net metering can satisfy citizens who advocate for renewable energy or feel that their utility is 
taking advantage of them. In states where utilities hold a lot of political power, customers feel 
that net metering can provide them greater freedom in their energy usage. Finally, net metering 
can help make residential photovoltaics more affordable by helping to pay for themselves. While 
solar panel installations altogether cost thousands of dollars, net metering can help reduce the 
payback time by a number of years (Imteaz and Ahsan 2018). 
 Of course, the value of net metering depends on perspective. For utilities, the idea of a 
“utility death spiral” is often cited. In this scenario, customers with solar photovoltaics on their 
roof will be using less energy from the utility and therefore paying less each month to the utility. 
This creates a positive feedback loop in which the utility increases rates for its regular customers 
to pick up the slack, which then leads to a greater number of customers dissatisfied with the 
utility and defecting from the grid  (Laws et al. 2017). Because of the disconnect between utility 
profits and the desires of customers, it is easy to see why utilities fight to stop or reduce net 
metering programs across the United States. The given definition of net metering describes how 
utilities are forced to pay customers at full retail rate; however, that is not the case in many states 
across America. A 2017 study found that while many utilities across America may ambiguously 
advertise full (retail) net metering rates under their programs, very few in practice actually 
compensate their net metering customers in this way (Schelly, Louie, and Pearce 2017). 
 24 
Community Solar 
 Net metering often leaves customers satisfied but the utilities dissatisfied, while no net 
metering leaves a utility satisfied but a customer dissatisfied. Because of this disconnect, a 
common middle ground between utilities and customers - community solar - is desirable. In a 
community solar program, multiple customers can buy into “PV projects ranging from a few 
hundred kW to a few MW on the distribution grid (i.e., non-customer-sited) administered by the 
utility or a third-party entity” (Funkhouser et al. 2015). Community solar programs are often 
advertised as a way for customers to purchase renewable energy even if they are unable to enter 
a net metering arrangement or if their roof may be incompatible with rooftop solar. Other 
participants in community solar may be renters, live in multi-family homes, or are unable to 
afford the upfront costs of solar. Regardless of the reason, a community solar program enables a 
utility to provide renewable energy to customers while maintaining the traditional relationship 
between them. By offering a community solar program, utilities can avoid some of the inherent 
inequities that arise from net metering and rooftop solar. Additionally, community solar 










Federal Legislation and PURPA 
 Under a framework of cooperative federalism, and given the federal government’s recent 
inability to pass a comprehensive energy or climate law, the onus of energy legislation has 
largely fallen upon individual states. As discussed above, recent federal legislation has primarily 
addressed renewable energy by providing tax credits as well as research grants and funding. 
Even those federal energy laws that have endured over the past five decades typically give some 
form of primacy, or regulatory responsibility, to the states. This is most evident in the Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 (H.R. 4018).  
PURPA helped to build a niche for renewable energy in the electricity market. Signed 
into law by President Carter, the law was passed in part as a response to the oil crises of the 
1970s and was part of a series of energy efficiency and production laws passed during the Carter 
administration. PURPA was meant to promote energy conservation and greater use of domestic 
energy and renewable energy. The introduction of new generation was to be achieved through 
the designation of a new class of energy producers: Qualifying Facilities (QFs). QFs are small, 
independently owned production facilities that produce electricity from wind, solar, biomass, 
cogeneration, and other sources. Under PURPA, utilities – which previously could pick and 
choose where to source energy – are required to purchase the electricity produced from QFs at 
the so-called “avoided cost”, which is the cost to the utility “which, but for the purchase from 
such cogenerator or small power producer, such utility would generate or purchase from another 
source” (H.R. 4018). Avoided cost rates and contract terms (i.e., contract length) are set by state 
utility commissions, which leads to great variation across states in the numbers and types of QFs 
approved and constructed.  
State commissions establish a utility’s “standard offer” for QFs by which the contract 
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length and rate are set. For example, a standard offer might contract for electricity at $0.05 per 
kilowatt-hour for 10 years. The length and rate of utility standard offers that are set by state 
commissions are vital to the financial viability of renewable projects, since they provide some 
certainty that allows banks and investors to see how and when the money borrowed to construct 
a facility will be repaid. Because of this, states that promulgate low rates and/or short contracts 
generally will not have as many QFs as a state that promulgates high rates and/or long contracts 
as part of utilities’ standard offers. In short, it makes little financial sense for a third party to 
build a solar farm if the contract given by the utility is insufficient to reap a profit. 
 While differences in PURPA implementation are certainly a key factor that can be seen 
when comparing the solar industries in North and South Carolina, they are not the only factor. As 
shown in the literature review, many different policy tools can be effective in making certain 
types of energy production, such as solar photovoltaics, financially viable. Differences in 
PURPA implementation also do little to explain the difference between the spread of residential 
and utility scale solar installations. In the following sections, I will describe and evaluate the 
different policy tools, ideologies, and motivations that the two states have utilized and 









Solar Energy in North Carolina 
Background 
State Politics 
 When it comes to presidential elections, North Carolina is considered a swing state – one 
that has no real tendency to vote one party over another. While this may be true on a national 
stage, this has an interesting effect on intra-state politics. Most of the state’s Democrats live in 
the urban districts surrounding cities like Charlotte, the Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill region 
known as the Research Triangle, and Winston-Salem. In the rural districts, Republicans 
dominate polling (Figure 7). Although the numbers of voters registered to each party in the state  
are similar, Republicans tend to dominate the state legislature – also known as the General 
Assembly – due to districts that were created as a result of gerrymandering (Wines and Fausset 
2019). Gubernatorial races, on the other hand, have not relied on districts. This consistent 
conflict in ideologies between the General Assembly and the Governor has led to a state where 
issues are hotly contested, but ultimately both parties must work together in creating policy. 
 In 2013, however, the balance of power in state government shifted. A Republican, Pat 
McCrory, was elected as governor for the first time since 1993. In addition, the Republican Party 
took complete control of the General Assembly- giving the party complete control of state 
government for the first time since Reconstruction. As a pro-business government, the McCrory 
administration and the General Assembly often favored utilities like Duke Energy in decision-
making, which gave those same utilities enormous influence within state government. A possible 
explanation for this preferential treatment is that Governor McCrory was a former 28-year 
employee of Duke Energy Corporation before his term as governor- a fact often used in 
accusations that his administration favored the utility giant (The Editorial Board 2014).  
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Figure 7: County Voting Records in the 2016 Presidential Election (“2012 and 2016 Presidential Election Results by State and 
County.” n.d.).  
 In 2016, after a hotly contested election, Democrat Roy Cooper won the gubernatorial 
race over the incumbent McCrory. Since winning the election, Governor Cooper has started to 
push back against utilities’ political power. Although not directly related to energy issues, 
Governor Cooper had a large majority of his vetoes over his first two years overridden – another 
sign of conflicts between the Republican supermajority in the General Assembly and his 
position. In the 2018 elections, however, Republicans lost a number of seats and their 
supermajority.  
Energy Statistics 
 North Carolina is in an interesting location for electricity generation. Despite not ranking 
high among the United States’ largest states by area or population, it still ranks in the top 10 
nationally in electricity generation (“North Carolina - State Energy Profile” 2019). A major 
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contributor to this statistic comes from the state’s location. North Carolina experiences both cold 
winters and hot summers, which leads to high electricity demand in both winter and summer due 
to heating and cooling, respectively. Consequently, this high demand for energy requires a high 
base load of energy- one that is provided in large part by nuclear power and natural gas (“North 
Carolina - State Energy Profile” 2019).  
While there are a number of municipal utilities and electric cooperatives in the state, 
electricity is mostly provided by two large investor-owned utilities: Duke Energy Corporation  
and Dominion Energy (Figure 8). Duke Energy Corporation, headquartered in Charlotte, North 
Carolina, is composed of Duke Energy Carolinas – its original territory – and Duke Energy 
Progress. The latter was added to Duke’s service area as a result of its merger with Progress 
Energy in 2012 that made it the largest utility in America at the time (“Merger of Progress 
Energy and Duke Energy Created Largest U.S. Electric Utility.” 2012). Because Duke Energy  
 
Figure 8: Investor-Owned Utility Coverage Map (“Maps” n.d.). 
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Figure 9: Annual Solar Installations in North Carolina (“North Carolina Solar” n.d.). 
Corporation employs thousands of North Carolinians and has a massive impact on the state’s 
economy, it wields a tremendous amount of political and economic influence within the state. 
North Carolina may not seem like a leader in renewable energy when compared to states 
like California or Texas, but the state has the second-most installed solar power generating 
capacity in the country (see Figure 4). Over the course of the past two decades, the state has 
experienced an explosive growth in both numbers of installations and capacity that has led to the 
state’s status as a national leader (Figure 9). Although this success has come mostly from state 
policies and regulations, the support of the general public has also been important to increasing 
renewable energy capacity and availability for citizens. Recent polling has suggested that the 
vast majority of North Carolinians would support a candidate that would support policies 
encouraging renewable energy options like wind turbines and solar photovoltaics (“Emerging 
Energy Issues and North Carolina Trends.” 2019). Although that strong majority holds across 
political parties, Democrats are more likely to support such a candidate than Republicans. 
Although many citizens support renewable energy because of environmental and climate issues, 




 As previously mentioned, with the passage of PURPA in 1978 states were required to 
determine the size of QFs, calculate avoided cost rates, and determine standard contract terms. In 
1984, just a few years after the passage of PURPA, the North Carolina Utilities Commission 
(NCUC) set that QFs of 5 MW or less would be guaranteed a standard contract for 15 years at an 
avoided cost rate that would be set every two years by the NCUC (Sanders, 2017). At the time 
these rules were established, the likely beneficiary was thought to be small hydropower facilities. 
However, this decision set the framework for the wave of solar facilities that would come a few 
decades later when further renewable energy policies were implemented (NC Solar Now 2016). 
Even though the NCUC decided to re-set avoided cost rates for utilities every two years, the rates 
have generally remained favorable to solar developers over the following decades. 
Tax Credits 
In addition to federal tax credits that were passed by the Carter Administration, many 
states within the United States also passed laws meant to encourage energy conservation. North 
Carolina passed its Energy Conservation Act of 1977 with the purpose, in part, to “promote and 
encourage the conservation of energy by providing a tax credit for installation of solar hot water, 
heating and cooling systems” (“Guidelines for Determining the Tax Credit for Investing in 
Renewable Energy Property” 2014). By encouraging the production of renewable sources of 
energy, the tax credit would help to conserve nonrenewable sources. At that time, the 25% tax 
credit was available for solar heating and cooling only; photovoltaic technology was not 
advanced enough at that time for mass production. It did, however, set the stage for tax credits to 
serve as an effective policy tool. 
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In 1999, the North Carolina General Assembly repealed various income tax credits 
related to energy and reassembled them into a single credit for investing in renewable energy 
property (N.C. H.B. 1472, “Guidelines for Determining the Tax Credit for Investing in 
Renewable Energy Property” 2014). The new tax credit defined renewable energy as including 
“solar energy equipment that uses solar radiation as a substitute for traditional energy for […] 
generating electricity”. Unlike the 25% tax credit put in place in 1977, this credit would reduce 
the cost of solar power systems by 35% and included solar photovoltaics, which were rapidly 
becoming more cost-effective and economically viable. This was particularly the case when the 
35% state tax credit was combined with the 30% federal investment tax credit, which together 
could reduce the upfront price of a solar photovoltaic system by 65%.  
Despite this discount, the widespread implementation of photovoltaic systems in North 
Carolina was at first limited for a couple of reasons. The first was that solar panels were still too 
inefficient and expensive for widespread use. Second, at the time of passage the external 
motivator of climate change – which could incentivize people to purchase solar panels – was not 
considered as urgent as it is today.  
However, as the solar industry became better established in North Carolina and as the 
prices of solar photovoltaic systems kept falling, the state tax credit was used more and more 
frequently. In the 2010s, the years-old policies began to lead to something of a solar boom in the 
state. By the mid-2010s, lawmakers began to suggest that the tax credit was no longer needed for 
solar installations to become cost-effective. Finally, in 2015, Governor McCrory signed Senate 
Bill 372, which created an expiration of the state tax credit on January 1, 2017 (N.C. S. 372). 
While a lag period was included to allow time for pending applications to be processed, this 
expiration was a sign of a new energy landscape in North Carolina – one in which renewable 
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energy was starting to be competitive with conventional sources of electricity generation. 
The Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard 
 A favorable tax situation alone likely would not have driven the solar boom in North 
Carolina. In the late 90s and early 2000s many states began to implement renewable energy 
policies other than tax incentives in earnest. Renewable portfolio standards in particular became 
popular, as shown by the 37 state-level standards that are in place today across the United States 
(see Figure 6). In 2007, North Carolina’s General Assembly passed a Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard (REPS) in Senate Bill 3 – making it the first and only state 
in the southeastern US to have passed a renewable portfolio standard with mandatory targets 
(N.C. S. 3). The stated goal of the law is to “promote the development of renewable energy and 
energy efficiency” by doing the following: 
1. Diversify the resources used to reliably meet the energy needs of consumers in the 
State. 
2. Provide greater energy security through the use of indigenous energy resources 
available within the State. 
3. Encourage private investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
4. Provide improved air quality and other benefits to energy consumers and citizens of 
the State.  
 
To achieve these stated goals, S.3 Section 2.(a) required that public utilities begin adding a 
certain percentage of renewable energy into their retail electricity sales for given target years. In 
North Carolina, these targets were: for 2012, 3% of 2011 retail sales; for 2015, 6% of 2014 sales; 
for 2018, 10% of 2017 sales; and for 2021, 12.5% of 2020. Interestingly, the definition of 
“renewable energy” in this bill did not include nuclear power as a renewable source of 
electricity, despite its carbon-free production. Additionally, Section 2.(a) contains a “solar set-
aside”, a provision that requires that some portion of the total utility requirements come 
specifically from solar power. These solar targets were for percentages of total retail electricity: 
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0.02% by 2010, 0.07% by 2012, 0.14% by 2015, and 0.2% by 2018 (N.C. S. 3). For utilities 
required to meet the general requirements, the legislature offered the following methods, among 
others: 
1. Generate electric power at a new renewable energy facility. 
2. Purchase electric power from a new renewable energy facility, which can be in-state 
or out-of-state (with conditions). 
3. Purchase renewable energy certificates derived from in-State or out-of-state new 
renewable energy facilities. Only 25% of the certificates bought to meet this 
requirement can be located out-of-state.  
 
For the purposes of solar power, these are the primary methods to be concerned with, although 
other methods – such as reducing electric generation through improvements in efficiency – are 
offered as well. The first is fairly straightforward: utilities can generate electric power at a new 
renewable energy facility. The second and third are similar in that they describe electric power 
purchased from new renewable energy facilities; however, utilities can either purchase the power 
directly from a third-party producer via their standard offer or purchase a renewable energy 
certificate to show that they have purchased the electricity from elsewhere. The bill, however, is 
clear that only 25% of the state’s requirements could be fulfilled via the purchase of out-of-state 
renewable energy certificates. 
 The implementation of the REPS in North Carolina was vital to the growth of a solar 
industry in North Carolina because, for the first time, utilities were required by the state to 
produce or purchase power from a renewable source. At the time of the REPS’ passage, 
lawmakers had wind energy or biofuels in mind when thinking of renewable energy, as few had 
foreseen the rapid decrease in the prices of solar PV systems. When falling prices of solar 
systems were combined with the REPS, North Carolina’s generous contract terms under PURPA, 
and strong tax credits, solar power began to expand rapidly in the state. With all of these 
favorable policies combined, it is little surprise that by 2016 North Carolina had more PURPA-  
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Figure 10: Utility-scale Solar PV Capacity as of 2015 (Sukunta 2016).  
qualifying solar facilities than any other state in the United States – despite being dwarfed by  
California in the overall number of solar facilities (Figure 10). The vast majority of solar 
installations in North Carolina have been at the utility scale, indicating that utility requirements 
from the REPS and PURPA have been vital to the growth of the solar industry within the state.  
As the solar industry in North Carolina began to boom, lawmakers and utilities began to have 
serious talks about the future of energy production in the state. 
Competitive Energy Solutions for NC 
 As third-party solar farms began flourishing in the early 2010s under North Carolina’s 
generous laws, utilities in the state began to lobby for less generous conditions. Because the 
PURPA-mandated avoided cost rates and contract conditions set by the NCUC had historically 
been favorable to the solar industry, investor-owned utilities in the state – and especially Duke 
Energy – preferred shorter terms and smaller QFs. However, environmental groups, the solar 
industry, and many lawmakers sought to continue the rapid growth of the state solar industry and 
touted the jobs it created. Out of this debate, and after a nine-month-long negotiation process, 
emerged 2017’s House Bill 589 (N.C. H.B. 589). While this act came as the result of negotiation 
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and left no party fully satisfied, it helped to ensure that the state’s solar industry could continue 
to grow. 
 While there are many parts to the legislation, most of them dealt directly with the solar 
energy industry and utility structure within the state. The first change, under Section 1.(b), was to 
adjust the state’s interpretation of PURPA. Under HB 589, utilities are now only required by 
PURPA to purchase power from qualifying facilities less than 1 MW in size for contracts of 10 
years or less. Previously, these contracts were for facilities less than 5 MW in size and for 
contracts of up to 15 years. Additionally, once the utility purchases 100 MW of capacity from 
these facilities, the contracts will become available only to producers under 100 KW in size. 
With the addition of this provision, the rate of expansion of QFs in the state under PURPA has 
dramatically slowed.  
The second change mandated by H.B. 589, under Section 2.(a), was that any facilities 
larger than 1 MW would be subject to a competitive bidding process, with each utility required 
to purchase a total of 2,660 MW over a 45-month period. While the utilities themselves could 
build their own facilities to meet the 2,660 MW target, those facilities could count for only 30% 
of the competitive procurement requirement. Through the addition of this change, utilities 
became more able to pick projects that would likely be more suitable for reliability standards and 
to result in lower rates. In short, two provisions of H.B. 589 marked a turning point in the solar 
industry of North Carolina, as they gave utilities greater control of solar energy production. By 
reducing PURPA’s influence in the state and creating a more competitive market, H.B. 589 
incidentally showed that solar energy was ready to become competitive with traditional energy 
sources. 
 Once the utilities achieved their goal of reducing PURPA’s influence, the solar industry 
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also needed to make similar gains. One major way that could happen was through expanding 
residential solar. Part VI of H.B. 589, the Distributed Resources Access Act, contains a number 
of points intended to make renewable energy more accessible to individual utility customers. 
First, the Act directs utilities to revise their net metering rates to ensure that residents could not 
benefit off multiple subsidies for renewable energy. This is based on the idea of cross-
subsidization – a negative situation in which non-participating customers see an increase in their 
bills to pay for the returns given to net-metering customers. Second, the Act authorizes solar 
leasing in the state of North Carolina- a move that makes solar power more accessible and 
affordable for homeowners, especially after the expiration of the state tax credit. By allowing 
third parties to lease solar panels to homeowners, businesses, and municipalities, H.B. 589 
removes the large up-front cost of installations and allows for the expansion of leasing programs 
that have been successful in places like California. For North Carolinians who could not access 
solar energy for some reason, H.B. 589 also mandated that each utility create a community solar 
program for its retail customers to participate in. Many residents of North Carolina do not own 
their residence or live somewhere unsuitable for rooftop solar energy, but community solar 
programs allow them to still participate in renewable energy. 
 Another provision of H.B. 589, Section VIII, directed large utilities in the state (i.e., 
Duke Energy and Dominion Energy) to create limited rebate programs for customer-sited solar 
installations (owned or leased) with set-asides for residential, non-profit, and school installations. 
Once again, this rebate program was intended to help make small solar installations more 
affordable for utility customers. While the rebates do nothing to reduce upfront costs of 
installation, they incrementally help the customers save money on the electricity they purchase 
from the utility and therefore shorten the payback period from the installation of solar panels. 
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 The final version of H.B. 589 was the result of a months-long negotiation process 
between groups of diverse stakeholders, and it shows a compromise. While it includes provisions 
to help utilities by reducing PURPA’s influence, it also helps individual customers to access 
solar energy and ensures continued growth of the solar industry within the state. Based on the 
provisions of HB 589, North Carolina is estimated to have a total of 6.8 gigawatts of installed 
solar capacity by 2022 in addition to added jobs and investment within the state. 
Net Metering 
 Most of North Carolina’s early progress on solar energy installations came in the form of 
utility-scale QFs, so residential solar installations were largely overlooked by state legislation 
until H.B. 589 in 2017. North Carolina still had net metering policies, but they came at the 
direction of the NCUC.  
 In 1998, years before the Energy Policy Act of 2005 required commissions to consider 
net metering policies, the North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association (NCSEA) presented 
before the NCUC and asked them to consider adopting a net metering requirement for utilities. 
Shortly following that presentation, the NCUC issued an order for an investigation into the 
proposed rule (North Carolina Utilities Commission 1998). About a year later – once all 
interested parties were brought in – the NCUC scheduled public hearings regarding the proposed 
rule (North Carolina Utilities Commission 1999). Following these public hearings, Carolina 
Power and Light Company and Duke Energy Corp. adopted experimental/pilot photovoltaic rate 
riders that would be available to a maximum of twenty-five customers on a first-come, first-
served basis. 
 In 2005, after a few years of experimental rate riders, the NCSEA filed a letter to the 
NCUC asking them to resume considering a net metering policy. After some consideration, the 
 39 
NCUC issued an order adopting net metering in the state (North Carolina Utilities Commission 
2005). The original policy allowed for renewable energy facilities up to 20 kW of capacity for a 
residential customer and up to 100 kW for a non-residential customer. In addition, net metering 
was offered to customers on a first-come, first-serve basis “up to an aggregate limit of 0.2% of 
the utility's North Carolina jurisdictional retail peak load for the previous year”. Interestingly, the 
issue of cross-subsidization was brought up even in 2005. However, the parties involved at the 
time felt that it would be a very minor issue due to the small scale of net metering arrangements. 
In fact, in 2009 the NCUC noted that examples of cross-subsidization did exist within the state, 
but that they felt the costs were outweighed by other policy benefits (North Carolina Utilities 
Commission 2009). 
 Following the passage of S. 3 in 2007, the NCUC felt that it was necessary to revisit net 
metering arrangements in order to maintain consistency with the new renewable portfolio 
standard. After lengthy consideration, the NCUC issued a 2009 order containing a couple of 
revisions (North Carolina Utilities Commission 2009). The first was a simple change in 
definitions to match the definitions contained in SB 3. The second regarded the limits on net 
metering imposed by the NCUC in their original decision. In this new decision, the NCUC 
concluded that it was “in the public interest to allow larger customer-generators up to and 
including 1 MW in size to net meter and that it is not necessary to continue to impose any 
aggregate limit on net metering” (North Carolina Utilities Commission 2009). By removing 
some of the restrictions, the NCUC felt that the goals mandated by the REPS would be more 
easily met. 
 Following that decision, there were no policy changes from the NCUC regarding net 
metering until the passage of HB 589 in 2017, although there was discussion in 2014 when the 
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NCSEA sought to ensure a mandatory ten-year extension of net metering rates (North Carolina 
Sustainable Energy Association 2014). This was spurred by both public and private comments 
made by Duke Energy executives indicating an intent to reduce net metering credits. The motion 
by NCSEA was denied, but the outpouring of customer support for the current net metering rules 
that came as a result showed the popularity of those rules. 
Executive Order 80 
 In 2018, in response to a growing demand for governmental climate action, North 
Carolina Governor Roy Cooper issued Executive Order 80: North Carolina’s Commitment to 
Address Climate Change and Transition to a Clean Energy Economy (Cooper 2018). As part of 
this order, the state Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) was required to submit a Clean 
Energy Plan to the Governor by October 1, 2019. Considering that the Plan is the product of an 
executive order instead of a piece of legislation, the DEQ committed to be open and inclusive in 
the process of developing the Plan by involving stakeholder input and creating a living document 
that could evolve. Because investor-owned utilities are the primary producers and distributors of 
energy in the state, they will play a vital role in attempts to meet the goals of the Clean Energy 
Plan. Two of the state’s primary utilities, Duke Energy and Dominion Energy, have recently 
committed to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 (Dominion Energy 2020, Duke Energy 2019). 
This will go a long way in ensuring that all parties involved are on the same page in meeting the 
goals of the plan. However, both utilities both appear committed to expanding electricity 
generation via natural gas as well. While the fuel contains less harmful pollutants than coal, it 
has been viewed as a bridge fuel – not an end-goal climate solution (Nunez 2014). In addition, 
the companies’ plans may change over the next few decades with economic trends as well as 
executive and stakeholder goals. 
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 Among other goals, the Clean Energy Plan aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
70% below 2005 levels by 2030 and to attain carbon neutrality by 2050 (“North Carolina Clean 
Energy Plan” 2019). While the state already is a national leader in solar energy, the solar 
industry will undoubtedly continue to be important in building up greater renewable resources 
and working with utilities to modernize and decarbonize the electricity grid. 
 While the Plan is undoubtedly a step in the right direction for North Carolina’s climate 
change policies, it is important to note that the Plan is just that: a plan. Although its creation was 
mandated by Governor Cooper, it was created to provide recommendations and a roadmap to 
achieve its stated goals. It does not actually contain regulations or official state policy; rather, it 
describes how different bodies – like the still-Republican General Assembly, the NCUC, or 
public utilities – can help put the plan into action. The Plan is also in its very early stages, since it 
was submitted to Governor Cooper in October of 2019. With Governor Cooper up for reelection 
in the fall of 2020 and a Plan that looks three decades ahead, it is unclear whether future 
governors and General Assemblies will fully commit to achieving the Plan’s ambitious goals. 
External Factors 
 Policies that have helped to shape North Carolina’s solar industry have largely come 
from state government, but outside events and influences have shaped the way that North 
Carolinians view solar energy as well as energy in general. Utilities play a major role in the 
state’s politics, but they have also been affected by outside events. 
Climate Change 
 The first major warnings of the dangers of carbon emissions and anthropogenic climate 
change came with the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Although the United States never ratified the 
international treaty, the topic of climate change entered the national radar as a potential issue. 
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Since then, projections of the impacts of climate change have grown more dire as the topic has 
become more polarizing in American politics (“UN Climate Change Annual Report 2018” 
2018). President Obama’s signing of the Paris Agreement and subsequent issuance of the Clean 
Power Plan appeared to place the federal government in a leadership position of climate change 
mitigation, but President Trump’s subsequent withdrawal from the Paris treaty and rollback of 
the Clean Power Plan has placed the onus of climate policy on individual states that are willing 
to act. Many states and municipalities have pledged to honor the Paris Agreement, including 
North Carolina. With a Democratic governor at the helm and a growing population concerned 
about climate change, it was likely that climate policy would factor into future energy policy 
(Marlon et al 2019).  
The Coal Ash Problem 
 Over the past decade, North Carolinians have increasingly held utilities responsible for 
issues surrounding coal ash, which is a major byproduct of coal combustion that can contain 
heavy metals dangerous to human health (Ruhl et al 2009). In 2014, Duke Energy and its coal 
plants came to the forefront of energy news when a pipe under one of its coal ash retention ponds 
burst, releasing about 39,000 tons of coal ash into the Dan River in the northern portion of the 
state. Following the spill, politicians and citizens alike called for Duke Energy to be held 
responsible and clean up the spill, as well as to remove its coal ash located elsewhere in the state. 
Finally, in January of 2020, Duke Energy and DEQ announced that the utility would be cleaning 
up six coal ash storage ponds and replacing them with lined storage pits, making it the largest 
coal ash cleanup in the American history (Martin 2020). 
 While the coal ash issue in North Carolina is not explicitly linked to solar energy and the 
solar industry, it may have led to greater recognition of the costs of fossil fuels and therefore 
 43 
greater demand for alternative sources of energy. Following the spill, a poll conducted for the 
Sierra Club found that a majority of North Carolinians – across the political spectrum –  
supported greater regulation and restrictions of hazardous fossil fuel waste (Pollard 2014). When 
the human health threats of coal ash are combined with the threat of climate change and 
decreasing costs of renewable energy, North Carolinian support for shutting down coal plants 
and promoting renewable energy is high. Interestingly, polling records over the last five years 
suggest that statewide support for renewable energy was at its peak in 2015, just one year after 















Solar Energy in South Carolina 
Background 
State Politics 
 Compared to its sister state of North Carolina, politics in South Carolina are almost 
simple. The state itself is much more rural than North Carolina, which leads to a consistent 
Republican majority (Figure 11). Because of its clear conservative leanings, energy decisions for 
the state have largely been decisions about cost and saving taxpayer money with energy bills that 
were formerly some of the lowest in the country. As the state has slowly grown in population,  
especially in the regions around urban Greenville, Columbia, and Charleston, it has become less 
Republican leaning. With the business-friendly approach that accompanies a Republican  
 
Figure 11: County Voting Records in the 2016 Presidential Election (“2012 and 2016 Presidential Election Results by State and 
County.” n.d.).  
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majority, utilities in the state have historically enjoyed favorable regulation by the Public Service 
Commission (PSC) that generally promulgates rules by the letter of the law and no more.  
Energy Statistics 
 South Carolina has an interesting history when it comes to utilities. The state’s territory is 
largely split into a few distinct regions where investor-owned utilities had monopolies with the 
exception of small municipal utilities and electric cooperatives. The major utility players in the 
state are South Carolina Electric and Gas (SCE&G) and Duke Energy Corporation, which is split 
into two separate territories of Duke Energy Progress (DEP) and Duke Energy Carolinas (DEC) 
(Figures 12 and 13). The third major utility in the state, Santee Cooper, is owned by the state. 
Because of that, it has little direct power in state politics. As discussed in a subsequent section, 
SCE&G was sold in 2019 to Dominion Energy after abandoning the construction of two new 
 
Figure 12: Dominion Energy Coverage Area in South Carolina (“Electric Utility Service Areas” n.d.).  
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Figure 13: Duke Energy Coverage Area in South Carolina (“Electric Utility Service Areas” n.d.).   
nuclear reactors in the state– a project that Santee Cooper was also involved in. Although Duke 
Energy is certainly powerful politically within the state, SCE&G’s (and now Dominion 
Energy’s) larger service area has led to its dominance as the most politically powerful utility in 
the state. While Santee Cooper is still owned by the state, its future after the nuclear plant failure 
is still up in the air. 
Due to decision-making within the state government that historically has focused on cost, 
South Carolina’s energy portfolio is heavy on fossil fuels and nuclear power. In fact, nuclear 
power provides over half of the state’s electricity, and large portions of electricity are still 
produced by natural gas and coal (“South Carolina - State Energy Profile” 2019). Like North 
Carolina, the state has one of the higher demands of energy in the United States due to its high  
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Figure 14: Annual Solar Installations in South Carolina (“South Carolina Solar” n.d.). 
summer temperatures. Unlike its neighbor, however, it has milder winters that allow a lesser 
demand during the winter.  
Due to a number of factors discussed later in this essay, South Carolina has experienced a 
sudden and rapid growth in its solar industry over the past few years (Figure 14). While it has a  
lot of work to do before it catches North Carolina, the state is quickly turning into a viable solar 
energy market. Nationally, South Carolina ranks 16th in installed solar capacity and placed in the 
top 10 in installed capacity added in 2019 (“South Carolina Solar” n.d.). Because of the factors 
listed below, support for clean energy in South Carolina is high. Polling has shown that a strong 
majority of voters in South Carolina support the development of renewable energy within the 
state, and a majority would support a political candidate that supports encouraging development 
of renewable energy sources through economic incentives (“South Carolina Clean Energy 
Survey” 2019). In South Carolina’s political sphere, where cost and payback of investments are 
vital, the latter majority indicates a shift in thinking and a belief across the ideological spectrum 




 As previously mentioned, with the passage of PURPA in 1978 states were required to 
determine the size of QFs, calculate avoided cost rates, and determine standard contract terms. In 
1981, under the terms of PURPA, South Carolina’s PSC began the process of implementing 
PURPA within the state. However, the PSC established very little. They decided not to set a 
minimum contract length at the time because of differing concerns between utilities. They 
decided to “[encourage] each affected electrical utility to offer contracts of five year duration” 
but avoided setting a minimum contract length (Public Service Commission of South Carolina 
1981).  
Because avoided cost was a new concept at the time, the PSC declared in 1982 that it 
would be “in the public interest” to set a standard avoided cost methodology for a few years until 
the relevant utilities had more experience with its complexities (Public Service Commission of 
South Carolina 1982). In 1985, they finally decided to determine a standard methodology for 
each utility (Public Service Commission of South Carolina 1985). Instead of setting a standard 
methodology across utilities regardless of circumstance, they instead approved separate 
methodologies for each one. Once again, during this decision, the PSC made the choice not to set 
contract lengths for power purchase agreements and instead urged “voluntary negotiations of 
long-term contracts” (Public Service Commission of South Carolina 1985).  
In 1989, the PSC held additional hearings regarding PURPA implementation. By that 
time, both the PSC and the utilities had begun to more fully understand avoided costs and power 
purchase agreements. In an order stemming from these hearings, the PSC once again decided that 
long term contracts “should not be mandated”, despite SCE&G and Duke Energy both offering 
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certain contracts in 10- and 15-year terms (Public Service Commission of South Carolina 1989). 
During these hearings, Duke Energy also submitted a standard contract form for PSC approval. 
Not only did the PSC approve, but they also ordered SCE&G and Carolina Power and Light – 
another utility that would eventually merge with Progress Energy and then Duke Energy – to 
submit their own standard contract forms. 
Although there is a large gap in PSC dockets archived on the Commission’s website from 
1989 to 2003, it appears that minimum contract lengths were not set for utilities until the passage 
of Act 62 in 2019. 
Tax Credits 
 In 2006, almost three decades after North Carolina passed the Energy Conservation Act 
that laid the groundwork in the state for a renewable energy tax credit, South Carolina passed 
Act 386: a wide-reaching tax reform that included a 25% tax credit for “the installation of a solar 
energy heating or cooling system, or both, in a building owned by the taxpayer” (S.C. S. 1245).  
The tax credit cannot exceed $3,500 or half of the taxpayer’s tax liability for that year, whichever 
is less. Similar to the tax credit given in North Carolina’s Energy Conservation Act, this credit 
included only provisions for solar heating and cooling but not solar photovoltaics. Just two years 
later, however, Act 354 in 2007 included solar energy systems for the purpose of generating 
electricity as a kind of system eligible for the tax credit, and subsequent amendments in the years 
since have added other forms of renewable energy (S.C. S. 243). Currently, the tax credit does 
not have a set expiration date. 
VC Summer and the Nuclear Fiasco 
 Following the federal Energy Policy Act of 2005, which included billions of dollars in 
subsidies for the nuclear power industry, legislators in the state of South Carolina, acting in 
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concert with the major utilities in the state, sought to make the construction of large base-load 
power plants easier for utilities (H.R. 6). This came in the form of Act 16 in 2007, also known as 
the Base Load Review Act, that demonstrates the political power that utilities have had in 
shaping South Carolina politics. The main purpose of this legislation was to “provide for the 
recovery of the prudently incurred costs associated with new base load plants […] when 
constructed by investor owned electrical utilities, while at the same time protecting customers of 
investor owned electrical utilities from responsibility for imprudent financial obligations or 
costs”  (S.C. S. 431). Ironically, the latter part of its purpose proved ineffective in the years 
following the bill’s passing. 
 The Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Generating Station, located about thirty miles northwest 
of the capital city of Columbia, is jointly owned by SCE&G and the state-owned utility Santee 
Cooper (Walton 2017). Similar to most of the other nuclear stations throughout the United 
States, VC Summer first began producing power in the 1980s. In February of 2009, following 
years without new construction of nuclear power plants in the country, the PSC approved a 
project request by the two utilities to build two additional nuclear reactors at the nuclear plant – 
despite opposition from the start about the plant’s cost (Brown 2018, Crumbo 2009). After 
reaching a contract with Westinghouse Electric Company to help build the new reactors, SCE&G 
and Santee Cooper announced that the anticipated budget of construction would be 
approximately $9.8 billion. Through the Base Load Review Act, the utilities began to recoup 
$1.229 billion of that cost by increasing customer electricity bills prior to completion of the 
project. However, once construction of the reactors began in 2013, costs quickly rose to reach 
over $25 billion. In 2017, Westinghouse Electric Company declared bankruptcy in part due to 
cost overruns at VC Summer and Vogtle Electric Generating Plant –another nuclear generating 
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plant under construction in Georgia. Just months later, both Santee Cooper and SCE&G 
abandoned the project – which was now billions of dollars over budget. Over the course of the 
project, SCE&G increased the electricity bills of its statewide customers a total of nine times for 
two nuclear reactors that will never be completed. At one point, “about one-fifth of SCE&G 
customers’ power bills were paying for the project”, in total accounting for around $2 billion of 
wasted money (Bland and Wilks 2018).  
 The backlash following the utilities’ abandonment of the project was immediate. Several 
lawsuits followed against the utilities and were settled. Especially damning was the Bechtel 
Report, an outside study – conducted over a year before the project’s abandonment – that 
detailed critical problems with the reactors’ construction (Final Bechtel Report 2017). At the 
time, the report was hidden from regulators by SCE&G. In dire financial straits because of the 
overruns, lawsuits, and plummeting stock prices, SCE&G and its parent corporation SCANA 
Corp. were forced to be sold.  Dominion Energy, their new owner, then refunded its new 
customers over $2 billion in the form of rate reductions and refunds (Wilks 2018). Dominion 
also took on billions of dollars of debt left over from the abandoned project. Santee Cooper, the 
state-run utility, could also be sold in the near future, although its future is unknown at the time 
of writing. 
There were also non-financial repercussions. The state’s Office of Regulatory Staff – 
which at the time had a conflicting mission of protecting both customers and utilities – and the 
PSC drew heavy fire from lawmakers and citizens (Wilks 2018). Because SCE&G was a major 
utility in the state, pressure also fell on state senators and representatives to ensure that the same 
mistakes were not repeated. In 2018, following months of debate and a veto by Governor Henry 
McMaster, House Bill 4375 was enacted, which effectively repealed the Base Load Review Act 
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(S.C. H. 4375). The general public and politicians still weren’t done, though. Ultimately, the VC 
Summer fiasco led to greater consumer demands for renewable energy and greater consumer 
choice, with some calling for a move away from the absolute monopoly of utilities in regional 
electricity markets. The culmination of this was the Energy Freedom Act of 2019.  
Act 236 
 Before the VC Summer debacle came to a head, some progress was being made on solar 
energy in South Carolina. However, for people looking to install solar prior to 2014, there were 
huge regulatory obstacles to overcome. While there was no explicit ban on solar leasing, laws 
establishing utility monopoly in a region meant that leasing solar panels from a third party was 
considered to be illegally purchasing power from another provider.  Another barrier to 
installation, however, was simply bureaucracy. Prior to 2014, South Carolina was notorious for 
making it difficult for people to install solar panels. In fact, one national report ranked South 
Carolina dead last in ease of installation (Wiedman et al. 2012). A third factor critical to the solar 
inaction was the lack of a renewable energy standard, such as what one might see in a state with 
a renewable portfolio standard. Finally, in South Carolina, nuclear power was (and still is) king. 
Over half of electricity in the state is produced by nuclear power generation facilities. In addition 
to the ultimately doomed construction of VC Summers reactors as well as other nuclear reactors 
around the state, South Carolina houses the Savannah River Site nuclear weapons complex and 
supports nuclear waste disposal industries. 
In 2014, lawmakers passed Act 236, which marked the first substantial renewable energy 
legislation within the state and addressed many of the issues facing the solar industry prior to its 
passage (S.C. S. 1189). It was the result of extensive lobbying and input from the solar industry, 
a coalition of environmentalist groups, utilities, policy-makers, and other interested parties (“Act 
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236 Progression” n.d.). According to the South Carolina Energy Office, the Act would “create 
jobs, lessen South Carolina’s dependence on fossil fuel imports, expand customer choice, further 
diversify utility generation mixes, and reduce pollution in the Palmetto State” (“Act 236 
Summary” 2016). Because of South Carolina’s conservative leanings, climate change was rarely 
mentioned as a motivation for adding solar energy; instead, it was largely framed by its 
proponents as an economic issue. North Carolina’s solar industry had begun to boom, so 
advocates of solar energy tried to frame it as an issue of rivalry for jobs and saving South 
Carolinians money. On the other side, utilities like SCE&G and Duke Energy were largely 
opposed to the idea of solar energy on the basis that it would hurt their bottom lines. Despite the 
utility power in the state legislature, enough momentum built to bring about a compromise 
between solar energy’s opponents and proponents – a compromise that passed unanimously 
through the State House.  
Section 2 of Act 236, also known as the Distributed Energy Resources Program, allowed 
utilities to voluntarily submit renewable energy programs to the Commission for approval. If 
approved, the utilities would be required to develop a set capacity of renewable energy facilities 
within the state of South Carolina. This set number would be determined by “an aggregated 
amount of installed nameplate generation capacity equal to at least two percent of the previous 
five-year average of the electrical utility's South Carolina retail peak demand” (S.C. S. 1189). By 
creating this section of Act 236, legislators ensured that participating utilities would commit to a 
modest renewable portfolio standard of two percent. Despite the voluntary nature of this 
standard, Duke Energy’s subsidiaries and SCE&G – the largest utilities in the state – submitted 
Distributed Energy Resources Programs for Commission approval. Although solar energy was 
listed as only one of a number of “distributed energy sources” in the legislation, the years since 
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its passage have shown that the vast majority of added capacity has come in the form of solar 
power. 
In addition to the voluntary renewable portfolio standard under the Distributed Energy 
Resources Program, the utilities would be able to recover their avoided costs by incremental 
increases on customer electricity bills. In the name of consumer protection, however, annual rate 
increases were capped at $12 for residential customers, $120 for commercial customers, and 
$1200 for industrial customers. While the full issues about VC Summer had not come out yet at 
the time of Act 236’s passage, rate increases due to construction were still being felt at the time. 
Act 236 sought to prevent similar cost overruns for renewable energy from hurting customers. 
Another part of Act 236, under Section 3, ensured the short-term growth of net metering 
within the state. Prior to this, net metering programs in South Carolina were minimal and 
voluntary for utilities. Under this provision, utilities would be required to make net metering 
programs available to customer-generators on a first-come, first-serve basis until “the total 
nameplate generating capacity of net energy metering systems equals two percent of the previous 
five-year average of the electrical utility's South Carolina retail peak demand” (S.C. S. 1189). 
Unlike the Distributed Energy Resource Program, this part of Act 236 was mandatory for all 
utilities. However, a theoretical cap was placed on net metering in the state. As such, utilities 
were not required to approve net metering applications after that two percent number was 
reached, which all but ensured that the utilities would not go over the cap. At the time of Act 
236’s passing, there was no clear consensus on just how impactful the legislation would be. 
Some people, especially solar energy’s proponents, were optimistic that a “solar boom” was 
coming for the state, while others were still unconvinced (Trabish 2018). Ultimately, net 
metering exploded in the state with widespread popularity, especially for SCE&G/Dominion 
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Energy (Figure 15). Because of the rapid solar boom, utilities reached the two-percent cap more 
quickly than anticipated. This resulted in a reduced growth of net-metering customers in 2019, as 
well as a smaller number of solar installations in that year (see Figure 14). 
While but a small part of the overall Act, one part of the net metering section detailed 
how the Commission “shall initiate a generic proceeding for purposes of implementing the 
requirements of this chapter with respect to the net energy metering rates, tariffs, charges, and 
credits of electrical utilities, specifically to establish the methodology to set necessary charges 
and credits” (S.C. S. 1189). Because utilities are required under net metering laws to pay 
customer-generators for the electricity they produce, the valuation of distributed energy 
resources – and solar energy in particular – has been a contentious issue across the United States. 
Utility customer-generators would prefer to be paid the full retail rate for the energy they  
 
Figure 15: Growth of Net Energy Metering (NEM) in the State of South Carolina by Investor-Owned Utility. Data Courtesy of 
Utility Filings to PSC, Docket 2005-385-E. 
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produce (also known as a 1:1 rate), while utilities would prefer to pay as little as possible for that 
energy. In the months following the passage of Act 236, this debate was a battleground between 
interested parties. 
Finally, a major component of Act 236 was its explicit legalization of renewable energy 
leasing. For individuals looking to install solar panels at their home or property, this provision 
helped to overcome a major obstacle of cost. Section 4 of Act 236 explicitly stated that: 
“An entity owning renewable electric generation facilities in compliance with the terms 
of this article shall not be considered an 'electrical utility' […] if the renewable electric 
generation facilities are only made available to a customer-generator lessee for the 
customer-generator lessee's use on the customer-generator lessee's premises or the 
residence where the renewable electric generation facilities are located, or for the sale of 
energy to that customer-generator lessee's retail electric provider or its designee, and 
pursuant to a lease”. 
 
While solar lessors were required to obtain certification from the state’s Office of Regulatory 
staff, this article of Act 236 opened the door for even greater affordability of residential solar 
energy. This clause ensured that third-party leasing of solar panels would not violate or serve as 
competition to each utility’s regional monopoly. Additionally, the article allowed utilities to 
introduce their own leasing programs (without recovering costs from other customers) so as not 
to be completely left out of the market. In doing this, legislators promoted full competition 
between solar panel providers, which was seen as a good thing. The Act did exclude the 
possibility for multiple customers to participate in the leasing of solar panels, such as those 
customers that are renters or those that live in multi-family homes, an issue that would ultimately 
be addressed by the Energy Freedom Act and its encouragement of community solar. 
Post-Act 236 
Following the signing of Act 236 into law, one of the major questions remaining was one 
of net metering: how should utilities reimburse customer-generators for the energy that they 
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produce? Because of Act 236’s requirements, utilities were faced with a question of how 
distributed energy resources (and solar power in particular) should be valued. Following a 
lengthy discussion between stakeholders, the PSC approved a settlement agreement in 2015 that 
established, in part, that 1:1 (full) net metering rates would be given to customer-generators 
through January 1, 2021 (Public Service Commission of South Carolina 2015). Following this 
agreement, utilities were required to file new applications to the PSC for the approval of their net 
metering programs. 
In the spring of 2018, faced with the issues presented by VC Summer as well as the rapid 
growth of solar and the rapidly approaching 2% cap (Figure 16), legislators attempted to 
establish a new energy bill: House Bill 4421. While House Bill 4421 was an all-encompassing 
bill that sought to address many of the state’s energy issues at the time, a primary provision of it 
was the removal of the 2% cap on renewable energy capacity (S.C. H. 4421). Furthermore, it 
introduced new net metering regulations that would have simplified rate structures.  
 
Figure 16: Progress Under Act 236 Toward Distributed Energy Resource Program Goals as of December 2018 (“Discussion of 
South Carolina Act 236: Version 2.0” 2018). 
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Because of the energy policy discussions occurring at the time in the state, House Bill  
4421 enjoyed wide support from both lawmakers and the general public – but not from utilities, 
who complained that installing solar on the grid cost them money. It passed the House with an 
easy majority and appeared to soon be bound for the Senate; however, everything changed the 
following week. At the last minute, just before a routine final approval, utility allies in the House 
raised concerns about a small portion of the bill that would exempt residential solar arrays from 
taxation (Fretwell 2018). Because the bill included a tax exemption, they argued successfully 
that the bill technically required a two-thirds majority to pass the House. With a 61-44 vote, the 
House failed to pass the bill. The effects of this were seen immediately with widespread criticism 
from legislators on both sides of the aisle. While the technicality could have been addressed 
earlier in the process by a committee, the utilities waited until the eleventh hour and showed their 
political power once again to kill a bill they opposed. With the bill dead, no further energy 
legislation was passed during that year. 
As part of Act 236 and just a few months after House Bill 4421 was killed, the South 
Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff (ORS) and the ORS Energy Office held a series of 
stakeholder meetings in the second half of 2018 to discuss the legislation, its ensuing regulations, 
and the future of energy in South Carolina. These stakeholders included “representatives from 
private and public electric utilities and cooperatives, renewable energy developers and solar 
industry groups, environmental and environmental justice organizations, consumer advocates, 
large energy users, and researchers from the Savannah River National Laboratory” (“Discussion 
of South Carolina Act 236: Version 2.0” 2018). In addition, ORS retained a third-party 
consultant in Energy and Environmental Economics, Inc. (E3) to produce a report on how future 
energy legislation (described as “Act 236 2.0”) might look.  
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Rather than prescribing specific policy solutions as a third party, E3 described the most 
contentious issues and laid out each side’s positions. These key issues included rate design, the 
“value of solar”, commercial and industrial renewable energy programs, and utility scale/PURPA 
installations. While these issues were not addressed by an “Act 236 2.0”, they preceded the talks 
that would result in Act 62. 
Act 62 and Energy Freedom 
 For lawmakers, there were several new issues to address in 2019. The first was to ensure 
that VC Summer or anything like it would not happen again. Second, lawmakers on both sides of 
the aisle wanted to ensure a continued growth of the solar industry. A key concept emphasized 
was the idea of “energy freedom”, which would help give South Carolinians greater energy 
choices. Because utility customers under SCE&G had no choice in the increased rates given by 
the utility during VC Summer’s construction, lawmakers placed an emphasis on the idea that 
customers could choose programs – such as solar energy programs – and rates that fit their needs 
or values. Third, as projections on climate change grew increasingly grim, some lobbyists and 
lawmakers began to feel more comfortable bringing it up as a problem area – especially in 
coastal areas like Charleston that are particularly vulnerable to climate change (“Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions” n.d.). Finally, as battery costs continue to fall, the legislature needed to consider the 
implications of battery storage on renewable energy – and solar in particular – within the state.  
Following the death of House Bill 4421 at the hands of utilities in 2018, most lawmakers 
started the next legislative session with a renewed determination to pass a comprehensive energy 
bill, especially due to solar lobbyists emphasizing that need and beginning pre-session 
discussions. The utilities, perhaps recognizing the writing on the walls, switched focus from full 
opposition of solar towards working to make new legislation work best for them. As a result, 
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House Bill 3659 was signed into law by Governor Henry McMaster in May 2019 as Act 62, also 
known as the Energy Freedom Act (S.C. H. 3659). Interestingly, the legislation describes “the 
state's policy of encouraging renewable energy” and lists the intent to build upon Act 236’s 
successes while preventing a “disruption to the growing market” of renewable energy (S.C. H. 
3659). While it left many decisions up to the PSC, the Act implied a clear direction for the PSC 
to work toward.  
 As with Act 236, this new legislation contains a multitude of different provisions. Section 
1 would potentially benefit utility-scale solar, as it requires for the PSC to open a docket to 
determine each utility’s standard offer and avoided cost methodologies as required by PURPA. 
This process will be repeated every two years to keep the terms updated. In addition, it sets 
standard offer contracts to a minimum length of 10 years and a “commercially reasonable terms” 
for small power producers. For contracts longer than 10 years, however, additional terms and 
conditions would need to be included in the agreement. 
 Another part of Section 1 contains details for voluntary renewable energy programs for 
commercial and industrial customers. Under this section, the legislation mandates that utilities 
file a voluntary renewable energy program to the PSC for customers with a demand greater than 
one megawatt in a single location. It also gives the customers the right to directly negotiate with 
an energy supplier on price and terms of the renewable energy. Many of South Carolina’s large 
manufacturers, such as Boeing, had expressed prior interest in using renewable energy in at least 
part of their operations, and this helped to address those desires while also signaling to out-of-
state companies that the state would be supportive of their energy goals. Finally, this section of 
the Act mandated that participating customers would bear the costs associated with their 
renewable program, which helped to ensure that costs would not be passed onto nonparticipating 
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customers. 
 In addition, Section 1 specifically signals that the state would like “to expand the 
opportunity to support solar energy and support access to solar energy options for all South 
Carolinians”. While the direct reference to the expansion of solar energy was surprising given 
the lack of specific energy sources mentioned in prior energy policies, this section sought to 
build upon the rapidly growing solar industry within the state. To ensure that all South 
Carolinians would have access to solar energy regardless of income level or property viability, 
the legislation encouraged each utility in the state to develop community solar programs. Once 
again, the section also included a customer-protection clause that ensured that nonparticipating 
customers would not bear the costs of community solar programs. Although this section only 
encouraged utilities to create such programs (instead of a mandate), it communicated a clear 
intent from the General Assembly to promote solar energy availability for all citizens within the 
state. 
 Perhaps the most important portion of the legislation is not explicitly mentioned in its 
wording. Because utilities had approached or reached the two percent caps on net metering and 
renewable energy facilities so quickly, there was a clear need to adjust or remove the cap. Act 62 
amended the 1976 Code by removing the two percent clauses altogether, thus removing further 
regulatory barriers to the expansion of renewable energy and the solar industry within the state. 
 Beyond the removal of the caps, Act 62 further benefitted customer-generators in several 
ways. The first way, located in Section 3, was through a new definition of the term “customer-
generator” that now includes “an energy storage device configured to receive electrical charge 
solely from an onsite renewable energy resource” (S.C. H. 3659). Because of the growing 
popularity of solar panel/battery packages offered to homeowners, such language was necessary 
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to put a number on and benefit the residential customers that were investing in battery 
technology. In addition, the inclusion of battery storage helps to both make solar energy more 
reliable and affordable for many homeowners. 
 Act 62 also adjusted net metering regulations within the state by building upon the 
settlement agreement from 2015 (Public Service Commission of South Carolina 2015). The first 
step, written in Section 5, was a provision that granted full 1:1 net metering until 2029 for all 
customers that applied to a utility by June 1, 2021. After that date, customers that applied would 
receive rates determined by the PSC using a “solar choice metering tariff” instead of a net 
metering tariff. This solar choice metering tariff, while intentionally vague in the legislation, 
would assess the value provided by the customer solar generation to the grid. In addition, utilities 
could continue to recover distributed energy resource program costs from customer-generators 
applying before the June 1, 2021 deadline. 
 In November of 2019, just a few months after Act 62 was enacted with the full intent to 
promote the state’s solar energy industry, the PSC issued two landmark rulings regarding utility 
standard offers and avoided cost methodologies. Instead of establishing standard offers that 
would be considered fair by both solar proponents and by utilities, the PSC established standard 
offers with the lowest rates in the country – effectively crippling a major portion of the solar 
industry and creating a “solar doomsday” (Fretwell 2019a, Public Service Commission of South 
Carolina 2019a, Public Service Commission of South Carolina 2019b). In addition, the PSC 
ruled that contract lengths longer than ten years were unnecessary. By ruling as they did, the PSC 
all but shut down the industry for utility-scale solar farms – despite a clear intent by the 
legislature to expand opportunities for growth within the solar industry. According to the South 
Carolina Solar Business Alliance, the PSC “made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for 
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new solar projects to be financed and built” (Fretwell 2019a). Just a few months later, in January 
2020, the PSC partially reversed course and issued a new ruling for Dominion Energy following 
public outcry from lawmakers, citizens, environmental groups, and the solar industry (Brown 
2020, Public Service Commission of South Carolina 2020). While the new avoided cost values 





















Where the States Stand Now 
 As of now, North Carolina is far ahead of South Carolina in solar capacity and 
installations. This is partially due to North Carolina’s longer timeline of policies (Figure 17), 
which has allowed it greater expansion of the solar industry and attempts to make solar energy 
work best for all involved. Its REPS, in particular, has helped to ensure growth of solar and other 
renewables in the state. While some of its laws, such as the tax credits that were implemented  
decades ago, may have helped spur early development of solar, the REPS in 2007 and favorable 
conditions to PURPA QFs were what really began to drive North Carolina’s solar development 
before South Carolina could start. Over the past decade, and especially since South Carolina’s 
Act 236, the two states have grappled largely with the same issues of solar leasing, standard 
offers for utility-scale solar, net metering, and the value of solar. 
In addition to getting a head start, North Carolina’s policies have been for the most part 
more progressive than those in South Carolina. One reason for this has been differing 
demographics: North Carolina’s more urban, more progressive population and government was 
quicker to support renewable energy and recognize the threats of climate change. Through these 
more liberal perspectives, policies emerged that helped North Carolina become a national leader 
 
Figure 17: Timeline of Major Solar Legislation in North and South Carolina. 
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Policy North Carolina South Carolina 
PURPA Qualifying 
Facilities 
Smaller than 1 MW; formerly 
smaller than 5 MW 
Smaller than 2 MW 
PURPA contract lengths 10 years; formerly 15 years 10 years 
Community Solar Mandated utility programs Encouraged for utilities 
Renewable Portfolio 
Standard 
12.5% target by 2021 None; formerly a voluntary 
renewable energy goal 
Net Metering Rates depending on customer 
choice (Time-of-use or 
standard);  
Limited to 1 MW in size. 
1:1 until 2029 for customers 
applying before 6/1/2021; 
Shifting to solar choice 
metering tariff after that date. 
State Tax Credit None; formerly 35% 25% 
Climate Goals Carbon-neutral by 2050 None 
 
Table 1: Summary of Major Renewable Energy Policies in North and South Carolina. 
in solar energy while South Carolina was left to catch up (Table 1). First, its tax credits (35%) 
were higher than South Carolina’s (25%). Although the sunset expiration of North Carolina’s tax 
credits has helped to put the two states on a more level playing field, a large portion of North 
Carolina’s development came prior to that expiration. Another major factor is the renewable 
portfolio standard in North Carolina. Although fairly modest from today’s perspective, a 
legislative mandate of 12.5% renewable energy capacity on the grid stood out from any policies 
in any other southeastern state. While South Carolina did introduce a pseudo-renewable portfolio 
standard with Act 236, it was both voluntary and filled only two percent of the state’s capacity. 
North Carolina’s mandates, combined with its generous contract terms under PURPA at the time, 
were major factors in its solar boom. 
Looking Ahead: What’s Next? 
 Even though both states took drastically different paths to build the solar industries they 
have today, they each have significant progress still to be made. In order to meet North 
Carolina’s climate goals, renewable energy will need to be expanded several times greater than 
its current levels. Although renewable energy on a large scale has largely consisted of solar 
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energy in the state, expansion of the offshore wind industry – a possible competitor for utility 
projects – is likely to commence in the next few years. It helps North Carolina that Dominion 
and Duke Energy have pledged to be carbon-neutral by 2050 as well (Dominion Energy 2020, 
Duke Energy 2019). By viewing the utilities as partners and stakeholders instead of opponents 
and obstacles, the state will achieve a cleaner transition. When considering that Dominion and 
Duke are also the major utilities in the state of South Carolina, the same decarbonization goals 
will hopefully drive renewable energy development within that state as well – even without 
specific state-mandated climate goals. 
 To achieve these goals will require large-scale adjustments to the energy grid overall. 
Even though increased battery storage will help to reduce some of the variability in solar energy 
supply, some restructuring still needs to be done in order for renewables to completely take over 
from fossil fuel combustion plants. State governments and utilities will need to determine the 
best ways to reconfigure the electrical grid to accommodate distributed energy production over 
centralized power plants. In addition, they will need to determine how best to compensate 
customer-generators for the power they produce at home and contribute to the overall grid. Such 
a transition could lead to the creation of jobs in one field but the removal of jobs in another. For 
example, Santee Cooper, South Carolina’s state-owned utility, has announced plans to close one 
of its two remaining coal plants beginning in 2023 (Fretwell 2019b). Although they hope to 
move their employees to other positions within the company, some jobs will be lost as people 
decide to retire or work elsewhere. At the same time, the solar industry employs more people 
nationally than coal, oil, and gas combined (McCarthy 2017). 
Politically, both states – but South Carolina especially – could see a shift in the balance 
of power in and around the state legislatures. Prior to the fallback from VC Summer, SCE&G 
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was seen as a major political force in state politics; however, their power has since been reduced. 
According to Sammy Fretwell, a reporter for The State newspaper, there is a sense that 
legislators in South Carolina feel emboldened to speak out more against utilities, especially the 
major ones. It is too soon to determine if Dominion Energy will regain some or all of SCE&G’s 
lost influence, but they certainly keep the appearance of trying to right past wrongs by paying 
back SCE&G’s former customers. In North Carolina, Duke Energy has faced scathing criticism 
from environmental groups, some lawmakers, and the general public regarding their handling 
and disposal of coal ash, but it is uncertain if their political sway has diminished in any way 
since Governor Cooper’s election as governor. In March of 2020, an article described some of 
the “rewards” that Duke Energy has provided over the past several years to lawmakers voting in 
its interests (Ouzts 2020). The utility has been active in providing donations from political action 
committees, advertising, flyers, and campaign contributions to candidates and members of the 
state legislature – even those who were not up for re-election. Duke Energy and Dominion 
Energy rank among the largest utilities in the country, so a large shift in political power is 
unlikely due to their resources alone – not to mention that Duke Energy is headquartered in 
Charlotte, North Carolina. 
Finally, the states could see some changes in laws at the federal level. Although North 
Carolina has begun to move away from the advantageous requirements of PURPA through 
competitive procurement utility programs, South Carolina still will rely on its PURPA 
requirements for the near future to further build its renewable energy industries. However, talks 
have come up recently around Washington, DC and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
around the terms of PURPA. While the law has been changed a number of times since its 
passage, mostly recently with the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the main goal is still the same: to 
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promote the development of small, independent renewable energy facilities. PURPA’s opponents 
today argue that its purpose is no longer necessary, since solar photovoltaics are now mostly 
competitive with conventional forms of energy production – for now (Inskeep 2018). That could 
change as the tax credit slowly expires over the course of 2019, 2020, and 2021. While the entire 
legislation is unlikely to be repealed, key provisions of the law could be amended in the near 
future. In addition to potential changes in PURPA, the federal investment tax credit is set to 
expire in 2022. Depending on the outcomes of the 2020 elections and the perceived need (by 


















 Despite vastly different paths and motivations, North and South Carolina are both well on 
their way to having solar energy make up a significant portion of their energy portfolios. North 
Carolina is ranked second in the country in installed solar capacity, mainly due to the generous 
contracts handed out to PURPA-qualifying facilities and renewable portfolio standard. While 
both policies have been replaced or made obsolete by newer policies – reduced PURPA-
mandated contracts, competitive procurement programs, and a carbon-neutral goal by 2050 – the 
future for solar energy in North Carolina has plenty of room for expansion. Further help will 
hopefully come from major utilities Duke Energy and Dominion Energy, which have both 
adopted climate goals that align with that of North Carolina. With solar panels that are cost-
competitive, favorable policies to growth, and utilities that share a common goal with the state, 
the future is bright in the state. 
 In South Carolina, the solar industry is just beginning to grow. Freed from the two-
percent caps on net metering and overall renewable energy capacity, the solar industry is starting 
to take advantage of the state tax credit still in place and a high demand for alternative energy 
sources. Due to the fallout of the VC Summer fiasco, lawmakers may be willing to meet that 
demand by further promoting the solar industry and removing legislative and regulatory barriers 
to implementation. In future years or even decades, South Carolina could also adopt climate 
goals or a renewable portfolio standard. Despite the climate goals of Duke Energy and Dominion 
Energy, the two utilities still seem to be opposed to the unrestricted growth of solar in the state. 
Due to their power within the legislature, the utilities will likely have a heavy hand in shaping 
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